海权论：英汉双语大国崛起经典维护国家海洋权力经典著作_(美)马汉著，欧阳瑾译_9787802569416

　　《海权论》是阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉的关于海战史及海权理论的作品，马汉在本书中划时代地提出了海权的概念，将控制海洋提高到国家兴衰的战略层面。他认为海权与国家兴衰休戚与共，海洋利益对于一个国家的强大至关重要，同时主张大力发展海军、发展商船队、发展海洋贸易、建设海军基地和商港。

　　本书从地理位置、自然结构、国家疆域、人口数量、民族特性、政府性质等六大视角解读了海权至上的观点。

　　作为一部海权名著的同时，本书也不乏文学性，客观而生动地再现了历次海战的过程，不露声色地表达了对那些卓越海军将领的赞美，详细阐述了海权在历史，尤其是1660年地理大发现至1783年美国独立战争结束的世界史的发展中起到的作用，同时论述了制海权的一些必要因素。

　　该书一出版即引起关注，美国、日本、德国与前苏联等国都先后将其作为制定国家发展战略的方向指导。自马汉去世以后，两次世界大战以及世界战略格局的变化，已充分验证了海权论的观点。　

　　我们当前严峻的海权形势已成为共识。我们要崛起，民族要实现复兴，就必须打破海上的枷锁，真正走向全球的广阔世界。制海权已经成为不得不直面的问题。希望我们精心编译的这本书，能够让每位读者认清当前的国际局势和所面临的重重压力，让你对未来不再迷茫。

PREFACE

　　The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.

　　A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. Twice, says Arnold in his History of Rome, Has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo. Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds: One point,

　　前言

　　本书有着一个确切的目标，那就是具体地根据海权对历史进程的影响，来审视欧洲和美洲的概史。史学家们通常都不熟悉海洋的情况，他们对海洋既无特殊兴趣，也无专业知识；因此，海权对于一些重大问题所起的深刻而具有决定性的影响，往往就被他们忽略了。对于某些具体战例与海权总体的发展趋势而言，具体战例甚至更符合这种情况。泛泛而谈，说利用和控制海洋是而且一直是世界历史的一个重要因素，做到这一点并不难；但找出并说明它在某一具体时刻的准确影响，却要棘手得多。然而，不这样做的话，我们对海权整体重要性的认可，就是含糊而空洞的；因为我们本来应当是以一系列特定的、清晰地显示出海权准确影响的战例为基础，并且在分析了某一特定时刻的形势之后，才能进行此种认可的。

　　从英格兰民族的两位史家身上，即可以看出人们忽视海上力量影响历史事件的这种古怪倾向英格兰民族之伟大，比其他任何民族都更可归因于海洋。阿诺德［1］在其《罗马史》中曾说：历史已经见证过，有两位重要的个人天才，曾经与两个伟大国家的资源和制度进行斗争；而在这两次斗争中，终都是国家获胜。汉尼拔与罗马斗争了17年，拿破仑与英国斗争了16年；前者付出了努力，却在扎马［2］折戟，而后者则在滑铁卢败北。爱德华·克里西勋爵在引用了这种说法之后，又进一步说：然而，这

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　　however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymens confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe.

　　Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibals communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between Spain, which was Hannibals base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.

　　On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection

　　两场战争相似性当中的一点，却并未得到充分的强调；那就是，终击败了这位迦太基伟人的罗马将军，与终给予法兰西皇帝以致命一击的那位英国将领之间，具有显著的相似性。西庇阿［3］与威灵顿［4］二人，虽说都曾身居高位数年，却都根本没有到过主战场。而二者主要的军事成就，也是在同一个国家取得的。西庇阿在西班牙时，跟威灵顿公爵一样，是在相继遭遇并且打败了敌人差不多所有的下级将领之后，才去面对敌军主帅或征服者本人的。西庇阿与威灵顿公爵二人，都在同胞遭遇了一系列挫折而产生动摇之后，重新让这些同胞恢复了对本国武装的信心，并且二者都是通过彻底而压倒性地击败了敌人的精兵强将，从而结束了一场旷日持久、危险可怕的战争。

　　不过，这两位英国人都没有提及一种更为显著的一致性，那就是：获胜的一方控制了海洋。罗马人控制了水上，迫使汉尼拔不得不经由高卢进行遥远而危机四伏的行军，从而令其手下身经百战的部队损失过半；这也使得大西庇阿既能够让军队从罗纳河沿河而上前往西班牙，以切断汉尼拔的交通运输，同时还能亲自返回来，在特雷比亚面对入侵者。在整个战争期间，罗马军团都是经由水路，不受袭扰且毫不疲惫地往来于西班牙和意大利之间，可西班牙本来却是汉尼拔的大本营；而梅陶罗决战，则取决于罗马国内的军队对哈斯德鲁巴［5］与汉尼拔所率军队的态度，且终原因还是在于汉尼拔的这位弟弟无法从海路带来援兵，只能经由高卢的陆路对其进行增援的事实。在如此关键的时刻，迦太基的两支军队却被长长的意大利分割开来，于是其中一支就被罗马将领们联合起来消灭了。

　　另一方面，研究海军的历史学家们，却又很少努力去了解普通历史与他们所研究专

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　　between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.

　　There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified by them.

　　The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader.

　　A. T. MAHAN

　　December, 1889.

　　题之间的联系，通常都只让自己成为海军历史事件的简单记录者。对于这一点，法国史学家的情况并不像英国的史学家那样；因为法兰西民族的天赋和法国史学家所受的训练，使得他们能够更加细心地去探究特定事件的前因后果，以及各个事件之间的相互关系。

　　然而，据笔者所知，还没有哪一部著作阐述了此处我们所要探究的这个特殊目标；也就是说，评估海权对历史进程和各国繁荣的影响。由于其他历史科目在研究战争、政治以及各国的社会与经济状况时，对海洋事件都只会顺带涉及，并且通常都是淡然置之，所以本书之目标，便是将海洋利益推向前台，但又不将它们与普通历史的因果环境割裂开来，而是力图表明它们如何改变了普通历史的因果环境，以及它们是如何被普通历史的因果环境所改变的。

　　本书所选的时间段，是从具有显著特征的帆船时代已然开始的1660年，到美国革命结束时的1783年。虽说维系接连发生的那些海洋事件的普通历史线索都被人们有意地忽略掉了，但本书还是想努力为它们呈现出一个清晰而不失准确的轮廓来。作为一名对自己的职业深有感触的海军军官，笔者在写作本书时，会毫不犹豫、自由自在地去探究那些与海洋军事政策、战略以及战术相关的问题；不过，本书略去了一些太过专业的术语，寄望这些简单平实地呈现出来的事情，能够引起非专业读者的兴趣。

　　阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉

　　1889年12月

INTRODUCTORY… ……………………………………………………………………1

导论… ……………………………………………………………………1

CHAPTER I Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power… ………………………29

章海权诸要素之探讨……………………………………………29

CHAPTER II State of Europe in 1660… …………………………………………99

第二章 1660年之欧洲形势……………………………………………99

CHAPTER III English Revolution… ………………………………………………152

第三章英国革命………………………………………………………152

CHAPTER IV War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713… ……………………181

第四章 1702-1713年间的西班牙王位继承战争………………………181